We provide attacks and analysis that capture a tradeoff, in the ideal-permutation model, between the speed of a permutation-based hash function and its potential security. For collision-uniform, fixedpermutation-order compression functions, we show that any 2n-bit to n-bit construction will have unacceptable collision resistance it makes fewer than three n-bit permutation invocations, while a 3n-bit to 2n-bit construction will have unacceptable security if it makes fewer than five. Collisions can be found in a rate-α fixed-permutation-order hashfunction built from n-bit permutations in about N 1−α queries, where N = 2 n . Our results provide guidance when trying to design or analyze practical permutation-based hash functions about the limits of what can possibly be done.
Introduction
Overview. Consider the problem of constructing a cryptographic hash function where, for reasons of speed, assurance, or minimalism, you've decided to base your design on an off-the-shelf blockcipher, say AES, with an n = 128 bit blocksize and a small, fixed set of keys. To keep things modular, you've decided to first build a 3n-bit to 2n-bit compression function from your n-bit permutations π 1 , . . . , π k . You plan to prove your construction sound in the ideal-permutation model, where the adversary has black-box access to the forward and backwards direction for each π i .
Perhaps surprisingly, the design problem just described is extremely challenging. If you write a construction down, chances are good that, after a while, you'll find an efficient attack. It's quite unlikely you'll find an easy proof. At least this was our experience, and over a period of many months.
In this paper we partially explain where the design difficulty is coming from. Basically, the problem is that it costs a surprisingly large number of permutation invocations to buy a reasonable level of security. In particular, compressing 3n bits to 2n bits needs at least five permutation invocations just to break the birthday bound of N 0.5 queries (where N = 2 n ) that motivates having a double-length construction in the first place. And even with five permutations there is still going to be a collision-finding attack that uses about N 0. 6 queries, which isn't all that great. These claims assume the compression function is collision-uniform, a technical condition that one expects to be met by any desirable-in-practice design.
In prior work, Black, Cochran, and Shrimpton [2] showed that any rate-1 iterated hash function whose compression function uses a single permutation call must be insecure in the ideal-permutation model. 3 In the present work, the Black et al. result is seen as a point on a continuum: while one permutation call is not enough, more and more calls buys you, potentially, better and better security. Concretely, we exhibit a quantifiable tradeoff between the number of permutation calls and the effectiveness of a corresponding attack. The attack's effectiveness diminishes rather slowly with the number of permutation calls.
The problem of constructing a cryptographic hash function from a fixed-key blockcipher dates to Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle [8] . They explain the utility of this problem and specify a family of solutions with inverse rates of 4-8. For the concrete parameters they suggest, a compression function mapping 310 bits to 256 bits using four calls to 64-bit permutations, our pigeonhole-birthday attack (Theorem 2) shows an adversary will probably have the information it needs to construct a collision after making about two million queries, assuming the compression function is collision-uniform. While this doesn't mean that there's a computationally efficient way to find the collision, it does suggest that, for the stated parameters, one won't be able to prove a decent security bound in the random-permutation model.
We want to emphasize at the outset that this paper is about attacks, not constructions or their security proofs. It remains an intriguing open question if, for every choice of parameters, there is a construction whose provable security matches that given by our attacks. Our guess is that the answer is yes, which would mean that the results of this paper are tight.
Our results and their interpretation. Let us now summarize our results one-by-one. First we look at the collision resistance of a permutation-based compression function. We show that if a collision-uniform compression function maps mn bits to rn bits using k calls to n-bit permutations-a signature we abbreviate as m k → r, eliding n-then an adversary will be able to find a collision using some 4 N 1−(m−0.5r)/k queries, where, again and throughout, N = 2 n . In particular, a 2 queries, which, for a double-length construction, is again too few. The collisionuniformity condition, defined in Section 5, demands that the output of the compression function should behave, more or less, as a random function would with respect to collisions.
Our bounds suggest a qualitative difference in behavior between the m k → 1 (single-length) and the m k → 2 (double-length) settings: in the first case k = 3 permutations is enough to potentially achieve the optimal security of N 1/2 queries, while in the second case no number of permutation calls can ever achieve the optimal security of N queries (even without collision-uniformity). It has recently been shown that one can asymptotically achieve the optimal security of N 1/2 queries with a 2
3
→ 1 compression function [9] , one of the rare choices of parameters for which a m k → r construction is known to have a security bound matching that of our attacks.
Next we put compression functions aside and look at collision resistance for a full-fledged permutation-based hash function H: {0, 1} * → {0, 1} rn . We show that if the rate of the hash function is α then an adversary can find collisions with about N 1−α queries. In particular, rate-1 hash functions are completely insecure, as already discovered by Black et al. for the special case of iterated hash functions using a single permutation call per iteration. In addition, a rate-1/2 double-length hash function (r = 2) will admit an N 1/2 -query attack.
As this is what one expects from a single-length construction, the conclusion is that a double-length construction must have a rate of less than 1/2. These bounds do not require the hash function to be collision-uniform.
We also look at the preimage resistance of permutation-based compression functions and hash functions. In the former case, a preimage for an m k → r construction can be found in about N 1−(m−r)/k queries, assuming the compression function is preimage-uniform, a notion defined in Section 7. In particular, preimages can be found in any preimage-uniform 2 queries. (Happily, the 2 3 → 1 construction we mentioned asymptotically matches this bound [9] .) So while collision-resistance can be "as good as a random function" with a 2 3 → 1 design, no such design can be comparably good with respect to preimage resistance, at least not if the outputs behave randomly (which is of course desirable). For a full-fledged rate-α hash function, a preimage can be found in about N 1−α queries, which is, rather oddly, the same as for collision resistance.
In a somewhat different spirit, Section 8 of this paper considers the number of bits that a permutation-based compression function must keep in memory in order to be collision resistant. We show that an m → r compression function must, at some point during its computation, keep strictly more than mn bits in memory, or else it will suffer from devastating attacks. If we imagine that the compression function is built from n-bit wires connecting the permutations, then the compression function must, at some point, maintain at least m + 1 active wires to have any hope for collision resistance.
Appendix A sketches a generalization of the attack of Black et al. Theirs is a collision attack on permutation-based iterated hash functions that use a single permutation call per iteration; here we adapt it to the case where k permutation calls are made per iteration. The attack is only applicable to iterated designs, and our version of it uses a heuristic assumption, but the bound is slightly better than that of our attack for an arbitrary hash function. Document history. An earlier version of this paper appeared in Eurocrypt [10] . The current paper incorporates revisions responsive to a manuscript by Stam [13] , which looked at the collision resistance of compression functions in the absence of the uniformity assumption. To clarify matters, we have made our (collision) uniformity assumption more quantitative and conspicuous. We have also introduced the corresponding assumption for preimage resistance, which had been inadvertently omitted from our earlier work. 
The Model
is always called-the single-permutation setting. It does not include the case where the identity of the permutation (ie, which π i is used at each step) is data dependent. This restriction turns out not to be so significant-more on that in just a bit.
Let H be a fixed-order compression function, notation as above, and let A be an adversary with access to oracles π 1 , . . . , π k (and, in principle, their inversesonly that this isn't needed in any of our attacks). The advantage of A in finding collisions in H is the probability that A asks a sequence of queries such that there exist distinct inputs v, v ∈ {0, 1} mn for which the adversary has asked all necessary queries to compute H(v) and H(v ). This probability is over the adversary's coins and over uniform permutation oracles π 1 , . . . , π k . (This sentence assumes the distinct-permutation setting. More generally, select a single random permutation to model each distinct π i .) Note that we do not insist that the adversary actually output a collision: we assert that it wins if a computationallyunbounded adversary could compute a collision from what it knows. It is true that this makes the attacks less "realistic" than if we had paid attention to the attacker's time and required it to print out its collision. But since our main goal is to understand the limits of what is provably secure in the random-permutation model, we can ignore time and adopt a liberal notion of adversarial success. As mentioned already, one can generalize the fixed-order model by letting the compression function choose which permutation to invoke at each step: in Fig. 1 , add in a line 3.5 saying j ← e i (v, y 1 , . . . , y i−1 ), and use j, not i, as the subscript for π at line 4. This no-fixed-order model was employed by Black, Cochran, and Shrimpton [2] . We ourselves prefer the fixed-order model, and as- sume it for quantitative results. Philosophically, letting permutation selection vary according to the data being hashed would make permutation-based hashing conceptually coincide with blockcipher-based hashing, contrary to the point of our investigation. More pragmatically, good lower bounds in the (simpler) fixed-order setting are already enough to imply good lower bounds in the (more complex) no-fixed-order setting. To see this, note that if H is a no-fixed-order compression function that makes k permutation calls, then there's a functionally identical fixed-order compression function H that makes k 2 calls: H just queries its k permutations in a round-robin fashion. Because of this, lower-bounds applicable to (the fixed-order) H are inherited by (the no-fixed-order) H if one simply replaces each k by k 2 . Since we are always thinking of k as a small constant, the quantitative change in bounds is not so significant. In particular, every qualitative conclusion that we draw in this paper is an accurate interpretation of our results for the fixed-order model and the no-fixed-order model, too.
The Trivial Attacks
We begin by acknowledging two trivial but nonetheless significant attacks on any permutation-based compression function, the exhaustion attack and the birthday attack. The former attack asks all kN possible queries, where N = 2 n . At that point the hash of every message will be known and so, by the pigeonhole principle (remember that m > r), there will be messages known to collide. This implies that it is, in some sense, futile to select an output length exceeding 2n bits, as 2n bits are already enough to accommodate the maximum feasible security 5 . With an output length of 3n bits, for example, you'll never get a construction withstanding anything near the optimal value of q = N 3/2 queries, as no construction can withstand more than q = N 1+(lg k)/n N 3/2 queries (the " " is because we assume that k is a small number).
The birthday attack is to compute the permutations necessary to hash p = q/k random messages. By the birthday phenomenon, one expects to see a collision when p ≈ √ 2 ln 2 N r/2 ≈ 1.18 N r/2 . For a proper upperbound, note that when N ≥ 2 16 , which we will henceforth implicitly assume, the probability of a collision is at least 1/2 if p ≥ 1.18 N 1/2 balls are randomly and uniformly thrown into N bins. We record the efficacy of our two attacks in the following proposition.
pression function, and let N = 2 n . Then with q = kN queries an adversary can find a collision with probability 1, and with q = 1.18kN r/2 queries an adversary can find a collision with probability ≥ 1/2.
In all theorem statements where, like above, q is an integer but the quantity on the right may be fractional, it is implicit that q is obtained by rounding up the expression on the right. Also, here and subsequently, it is not necessary to restrict m and r to natural number; it is fine to select any rational values m and r such mn and rn are positive integers.
The Pigeonhole Attack
We now give a more interesting collision attack on compression functions. It succeeds, always, in about kN 1−(m−r)/k queries.
pression function, and let N = 2 n . Then with
The concrete consequences of this are interesting. Suppose H is a 2 1 → 1 compression function. Then it can be broken in just q = 2 queries. So k = 1 permutation calls certainly won't do, as shown by Black, Cochran, and Shrimpton [2] in the iterated hash-function setting. In addition, we see that a 2 2 → 1 compression function can be broken in about N 1/2 queries, which is optimal for a hash function of output length n, except that Theorem 1 states the collision can be found with probability 1, whereas an ideal construction would require 2N queries for the same result. Quantitative results are tabulated in the top half of Fig. 2 .
Proof. Let p = q/k . In brief, the adversary chooses p queries to make to π 1 that enable him to "start" hashing the largest possible number of inputs (each input requires a π 1 query); then the adversary chooses p queries to make to π 2 that will enable him to continue hashing the largest possible number of inputs up to and including the π 2 step; and so on for π 3 , . . ., π k . If, at the end, the adversary is still able to hash more than N r inputs, then the adversary wins because some two inputs necessarily collide. The proof simply consists of computing how large p must be for the latter event to happen.
Note first the observation that if B balls are thrown into N bins the p ≤ N most occupied bins must contain at least pB/N balls. We will repeatedly use this observation below. Now with the hash function H specified by
n that has a maximum number of preimages under f 1 . By the observation just made, this maximum number of preimages is at least pN m /N = pN m−1 points. The adversary will ask for π 1 at each point x 1 ∈ X 1 . The adversary has so far made p queries and there are at least pN
mn for which the adversary knows how to compute the first permutation in the hash chain. Call this set of points V 1 . So |V 1 | ≥ pN m−1 and for each point v ∈ V 1 the adversary knows the corresponding x 1 , y 1 , and
n with a maximum number of v ∈ V 1 that give rise to an x 2 ∈ X 2 . Again by the observation that began this paragraph, this set of points V 2 has cardinality
Continue in this way, selecting a set V 3 where |V 3 | ≥ p 3 N m−3 and making p more queries so that the adversary will know how to compute the beginning computations of a hash value for everything in V 3 , knowing everything up to and including the third permutation π 3 . Continue until the adversary constructs a set V k where |V k | ≥ p k N m−k and the adversary knows how to hash everything in V k all the way until the end.
If
, by the pigeonhole principle, there must be two values in V k that have the same hash, and this hash is known by the adversary we have constructed. Thus the adversary will succeed in finding a collision if p k > N r−m+k , which is to say that it necessarily succeeds if p > N (r−m+k)/k = N 1−(m−r)/k . So the adversary will find a collision if q/k exceeds N 1−(m−r)/k (hence the chosen value of q). This completes the proof.
The Pigeonhole-Birthday Attack
In the proof above we used the fact that a collision is guaranteed as soon as
But it seems unlikely that one would really have to wait so long as that; one expects, by the birthday phenomenon, to see a collision around the time that |V k | = N r/2 , or, to be more exact, around the time that
, an improvement from the earlier bound of q ≈ kN 1−(m−r)/k by a multiplicative factor of N r/2k . However, the analysis just given pretended that the H-values that arose were uniform, which need not be the case. For example, one can easily "rig" the functions f 1 , . . . , f k , g of Fig. 1 such that V k will be independent of the answers to the adversary's queries and g is injective on V k , leading to no collisions at all. (See Stam [13] for a more interesting example in this connection.) Still, one does not expect a desirable-inpractice compression function to have this sort of degeneracy; for a real-world compression function, if you know the hash of 1.18N r/2 points, probably you know a collision.
The discussion above motivates the following definitions. Let H:
rn be a compression function making calls to n-bit permutations π 1 , . . . , π k and let A = {A q : 1 ≤ q ≤ kN } be a family of adversaries where A q makes at mostueries to these permutations or their inverses. Let yield H (A q ) be the minimum number of strings that A q learns to hash in the course of its attack, let coll H (A q ) be the probability that A q finds a collision in H (ie, it asks the queries to know one), and let coll * H (Q) be the probability of a collision when Q points are uniformly selected from the range of H. Then the collision-degeneracy of H with respect to A is defined as the smallest real number
For any adversary family A, the amount that λ H,A exceeds 1 is a measure of how peculiar H is with respect to the property of seeing collisions with their anticipated probability. For example, if λ H,A = 2 then yield H (A q ) needs to be twice the nominal 1.18N r/2 before one is guaranteed that coll H (A q ) ≥ 1/2. Since a good compression function should emulate a random function as much as possible, one expects that λ H,A will not significantly exceed 1 for most A when H is a desirable, real-world construction.
Consider now the specific family of adversaries A = {A q } consisting of adversaries running the greedy attack of Theorem 1. We call this the family of greedy adversaries, and we define the collision-degeneracy of H as the collision degeneracy λ H = λ H,A with respect to the family of greedy adversaries A. Recall that A q makes p = q/k queries to each permutation in a way that maximizes the number of inputs that can be hashed up to that point. By the calculation given at the beginning of this section, adversary A q knows that hash of at least
Solving the former inequality for q using the fact that yield
This establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let
n . Then with → r compression function. Columns represent the attack, the advantage lower bound, the compression parameters, the approximate value of q to get this advantage, and numerical values for various k (using the exact formula) when n = 128. Rows represent the pigeonhole attack (ph) and the pigeonhole-birthday attack (pd) where, for the latter, the compression function is collision-uniform with λ = 1.
that a non-collision-uniform compression-function can have collision resistance higher than N 1−(m−0.5r)/k [13] , illustrating that collision resistance can be increased at the expense of maintaining a resemblance to a random function.
The 
As this is somewhat hard to compute, an alternative is to note that, at the end of the pigeonhole-birthday attack, there are at least p = q/k strings that the adversary knows how to hash, and so p = 1.18λN r/2 queries are enough. We can therefore sharpen the statement of Theorem 2 to select q as the minimum of the current value of q and 1.18λkN Fig. 2 we use this tighter bound to compute the row-3 entries.
Interpretation. Assuming a non-degenerate compression function, for 2 → 1 hashing the analysis indicates that, with k = 2 permutations, a collision will be found in around N 1/4 queries. This is excessively low, making k = 3 permutations the best one can hope for in this case. With k = 3 permutations the bound jumps to around N 1/2 queries, which is of course optimal for a hash function producing an n-bit output. This suddenly-optimal behavior is qualitatively different from what happens when the output length is 2n bits or more, in which case more permutation calls (potentially) buys more security, but where optimal collision resistance can never reached. For 3 → 2 hashing the adversary can break the construction in around q = N 1−2/k queries (still assuming non-degeneracy). Since a double-length construction ought to withstand significantly more than N 1/2 queries (otherwise, it makes more sense to use a single-length construction), the conclusion is that k = 5 permutations is the minimum number of calls that makes sense for a desirable-in-practice 3 → 2 compression function.
Attacks on Rate-α Constructions
Theorems 1 and 2 can be recast in terms of what they say about a permutationbased hash function with a given rate (as opposed to what they say about a compression function with a given number of blockcipher calls). Let H : {0,
rn be a fixed-order hash function based on an n-bit permutation. This means that the algorithm is of the form specified in Fig. 1 rn that makes at most k = βm permutation calls. By Theorem 1, a collision for this compression function can be found with probability 1 in k(N 1−(m−r)/k +1) ≤ k(N 1−α+r/k +1) queries, where again k = βm (the inequality holds because α ≤ m/k). We set m = ln(2)αnr + α so k = β ln(2)αnr + α (chosen by calculus to minimize
Ignoring the leading multiplicative and additive factors in Theorem 3 we can summarize the result as saying that any rate-α permutation-based hash function will fail when the number of queries gets to around q = N 1−α . In Fig. 3 we tabulate this more precisely, indicating the sufficient number of queries to break permutation-based hash functions of various rates. Note that Theorem 3 does not require a uniformity assumption. That said, one can slightly improve the bound by assuming H is collision-uniform and employing Theorem 2 instead of Theorem 1. The gains are small; for λ = 1 the number of queries (and the adversary's probability of success) is halved. We comment that, in Theorem 2, the number of distinct permutations used by the hash function does not matter, as long as they are consulted in a fixed order. Potentially, the hash function might never reuse the same permutation twice, but it would still suffer from the same attack.
Attacking Preimage Resistance
We adopt as a notion of preimage resistance that the adversary is presented a random range point w ∈ {0, 1} rn and succeeds if it finds (or simply knows from its query history) a preimage for it. The intuition behind our preimage attacks is that the pigeonhole attack of Theorem 1 yields the hash of as many points as there are points in the compression function's range; one then expects any point in the range to be inverted with some constant probability. However there is a subtle issue: knowing the hash of many distinct inputs does not equate with knowing many distinct outputs; if the compression function suffers from many collisions, maybe only a few outputs are gleamed even though many inputs that can be computed. This idea can be leveraged to give examples of compression functions that have good preimage resistance, use only one permutation call, and where the domain is arbitrarily bigger than the range. See Fig. 4 . Thus to state a meaningful bound some sort of uniformity assumption must be made about the compression function. This motivates the definition that follows.
Let H: {0, 1} mn → {0, 1} rn be a compression function making calls to nbit permutations π 1 , . . . , π k and let A = {A q : 1 ≤ q ≤ kN } be a family of adversaries where A q makes at mostueries to these permutations or their inverses. As before, let yield H (A q ) be the minimum of strings that A q learns to hash. Let preim H (A q ) be the probability that A q (x) finds a preimage for x in the experiment where x ∈ {0, 1} rn is chosen uniformly. Let preim * H (Q) be the probability that a fixed (or, equivalently, a uniformly chosen) x ∈ {0, 1} Similarly to collision resistance, we define the preimage-degeneracy δ H of H to be the preimage degeneracy δ H,A of H with respect to the family of greedy adversaries A from Theorem 1. We say that a compression function H is preimageuniform if δ H is less than a small constant, say δ H ≤ 2. As with collision resistance, one expects that a "good" (desirable in practice) compression function H will be preimage-uniform, since a random function is preimage-uniform.
Standard probability computations show that, for a random function H from {0, 1} mn to {0, 1} rn and an arbitrary (or uniform) point x ∈ {0, 1} rn , we will have Pr[x ∈ H ({1, 2, . . . , t})] ≥ 1/2 when t ≥ ln(2)N r for any distinct points 1, 2, . . . , t. Thus it is sufficient to learn the hash of at least ln(2)δ H, N r points in order to invert a point with probability 1/2. Solving the inequality (2)δ H, N r for q = kp gives the following theorem based on the pigeonhole attack.
Theorem 4. Let H: {0, 1}
mn → {0, 1} rn be a k-call permutation-based compression function and let N = 2 n . Then with
queries an adversary can invert a random point with probability at least 1/2, where δ = δ H is the preimage-degeneracy of H. 2
By restricting a hash function to a fixed input and considering the resulting function as a compression function one can apply Theorem 4 to obtain a bound on the preimage resistance of a hash function. For this purpose, say that a hash function H has preimage-degeneracy δ H if the restriction of H to inputs of size {0, 1} mn is a compression function with preimage-degeneracy at most δ H for all m. We then easily get: It is interesting that breaking the preimage resistance of a preimage-uniform permutation-based hash function is essentially no harder than breaking its collision resistance. In addition, while one may hope to get near-optimal collision resistance with a 2 3 → 1 compression function, the preimage resistance will be nowhere near optimal for a preimage-uniform hash function: preimage-resistance will fail by around N 2/3 queries, whereas one might hope for something that works up to around N queries. But, as with the collision-resistance of doublelength constructions, one can hope to push up the preimage resistance to close to N queries by using more and more permutation calls.
The Too-Few-Wires Attack
In this section we switch from considering the number of permutations used by a compression function to considering the amount of memory it requires. Mainly we show that a compression function that maps mn bits to rn bits must keep more than mn bits of information in memory at some point during its computation-otherwise it will offer essentially no collision resistance.
Instead of thinking about memory it is useful to think in terms of wires. If we imagine that the compression function is built from n-bit wires connecting the permutations and processed at different points by arbitrary functions, our result implies that at least m + 1 wires must be used at some point during the computation-one one more wire than there are input wires.
Naturally one needs to define what it means for a compression function to "keep mn bits in memory" during a computation. The model is as follows: we imagine the mn bits to be kept in m "buckets" of n bits each. At any stage, the buckets may either be processed by an arbitrary function
mn ; or else one of the buckets may be hit with a permutation π i , replacing the contents of that bucket with the output of the permutation. The buckets are initialized with the input to the compression function, and the computation is terminated by an arbitrary function mapping {0, 1} mn to {0, 1} rn . One may assume that no two functions f i and f j are ever applied one right after the other (else one could replace them with their composition), and one can assume that permutations are always applied to the first bucket (as the f i functions can be used to switch bucket contents). Thus if the compression function uses k permutations (π 1 , . . . , π k ) and we denote byπ i the map from {0, 1} mn to {0, 1} mn that is π i on the the first bucket and the identity on all
Fig . 5 . The structure of a compression function that maps mn bits to rn bits using mn bits of memory where m = 3, r = 2, and k = 4. Each wire represents n bits. Functions f0, f1, f2, f3, and f4 are all arbitrary.
others, then the hash of v ∈ {0, Figure 5 shows the basic structure, with buckets drawn as wires. The sequence of permutations (π 1 , . . . , π k ) may be distinct or include repetitions, but we assume that the permutations are applied in a fixed order, namely that which permutation is applied at a given point does not depend on the contents of the buckets at that point (this restriction can in fact be removed with only a slight increase in the complexity of the attack, so this assumption is mainly made for simplicity). We then have the following:
rn be a permutation-based compression function using k permutation calls and mn bits of memory. Then a collision can be found in 2k queries. 2
Proof. With notation as in the paragraph before Theorem 6, let j be the least number such that f j is not a permutation. Note that j is well-defined since f k is not a permutation. Fix any two distinct inputs u and v in {0,
and we are done.
One can generalize this result. Assume that we have at our disposal k ideal primitives ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k , which are functions from {0, 1} mn to {0, 1} mn and such that (i) finding a collision for ρ i costs q i expected queries to ρ i , unless ρ i is a permutation, in which case (ii) finding a preimage for ρ i costs one query. (An n-bit permutation can be seen as such a primitive, acting only on the first n bits.) A compression function using (ordered) calls ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k and mn bits of memory can be modeled as above, with mn-bit to mn-bit functions f 0 , . . . , f k interwoven with ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k . Then one can easily adapt the proof of Theorem 6 to show that the cost of finding a collision for the compression function is at most max(q i )+2k, where the max is taken over all i such that ρ i is not a permutation, and is defined as 0 if all the ρ i 's are permutations. (Proof: take the least j such that either f j or ρ j is not a permutation; in the former case let u, v be colliding inputs of f j , in the latter case let u, v be colliding inputs of ρ j paid for with q j queries; then push back u, v to inputs u , v for the original function using the fact that all ρ i 's and f i 's for i < j are permutations.)
This observation has some interesting consequences. For example, say that ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k are random functions from n bits to n bits, so that it costs 2 n/2 queries to find a collision for given ρ i . Then a compression function from mn bits to rn bits using mn bits of memory, m > r, will have collision resistance of at most 2k + 2 n/2 , where k is the number of times the random function is called. This is unsatisfactory if r ≥ 2. It does not matter whether the random functions are distinct or not, nor how many of them are used.
One can also apply the argument to a blockcipher-based construction, say one with n-bit keys and blocks. First define what it means for a blockcipher to "act" on mn bits: one could assume, say, that the first bucket of n bits is used for the blockcipher's key, that the second bucket of n bits is used for the blockcipher's input, and that the blockcipher's output replaces either the first or second bucket. If the blockcipher's output replaces the key, then the blockcipher application is not a permutation and has collision resistance of 2 n/2 (a collision can be obtained by keeping the word constant and tweaking the key); otherwise the blockcipher application constitutes a permutation. Thus, any mn-bit to rn-bit blockcipherbased compression function using only mn-bits of memory in the sense described has collision resistance of ∼ 2 n/2 , which is once again unsatisfactory if r ≥ 2. As an example of the findings in this section in action, suppose that someone proposes a 3n-bit to 2n-bit compression function as shown in Fig. 5 , but where we have 10 rounds and each f i has some combinatorially strong mixing properties. It will not matter that there are a large number of rounds or that the mixing is strong; the scheme will be breakable in a handful of queries. The issue is that the first collision in any of the f i 's can be "pushed back" through the permutations to make two colliding inputs. Then suppose that, to prevent the pushing back, the designer replaces each x → π i (x) by the feed-forward gadget x → x ⊕ π i (x). Then the number of required wires has gone up by 1, and the attack is blocked. However if we treat the gadget x ⊕ π i (x) as a primitive, the number of wires is back down to 3 and the generalized attack shows that a collision can be found in 2 n/2 queries, or the number of queries necessary to find a collision for the gadget x ⊕ π i (x). This is insufficient in a scheme that outputs 2n bits. Finally, we comment that it was not important for the attacks of this section that the input length and output length of the compression be multiples of n; all that matters is that the input has at least one more bit than the output.
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The construction uses k calls to process sn bits, so its rate is α = s/k = (m − r)/k. Natural variants to this model, like letting the compression function H depend on the position index i, are immaterial in the sequel.
As the name suggests, the tree attack is associated to a certain tree, which we will call the known-hash tree. The known-hash tree is constructed deterministically from a set of queries. Before describing anything else, we show how to construct the known-hash tree from a set of queries
The known-hash tree is a subtree of an infinite rooted tree called the full tree. The full tree has k + 1 types of nodes, which we denote type 0, type 1, . . ., type k. A node of type i has children only of type i + 1, except for a node of type k, which has children of type 0. The root of the full tree has type 0. This completes the description of the full tree. The known-hash tree is a subtree of the full tree. It is defined from a set of queries Q = { (i 1 , x i1 , y i1 ) , . . ., (i q , x iq , y iq )} made by the adversary, where π ij (x ij ) = y ij for all 1 ≤ j ≤ q. A node v of the full tree is in the known-hash tree if and only if for every node v i = v of type i ≥ 1 on the path from v to the root the query (i, x i , y i ) is in Q where x i is the value of v i and where y i is the value of the outgoing edge of v i on the path to v. It follows that if v is in the known-hash tree then so are all of its ancestors, so this is defines a valid (but possibly infinite) tree.
If a node v of type 0 is in the known-hash tree then the adversary knows the hash of the word w 1 w 2 · · · w m where w 1 , . . . , w m are the values of the outgoing edges of the nodes of type 0 on the path from the root to v. This hash is in fact equal to the value of node v. One can also see that every node of type i ≥ 1 has outdegree ≤ 1 in the known-hash tree, since for every value x i there is only one y i such that π i (x i ) = y i . However the outdegree of every node of type 0 is always N s , since if a node of type 0 is in the known-hash tree then so, by definition, are all of its children. We will call the reduced outdegree of a node v of type 0 the number of outgoing edges from v that lie on a path to a node of type 0 further down the tree from v. The reduced known-hash tree, or simply reduced tree, is the restriction of the known-hash tree to nodes of type 0, where there is an edge from u to v in the reduced tree if and only if u is the first node of type 0 on the path from v to the root in the known-hash tree. Note that the outdegree of a node v in the reduced tree is equal to the reduced outdegree of v in the known-hash tree. One can define a natural bijection from the outgoing edges of v in the reduced tree to those outgoing edges of v in the known-hash tree that lie on a path to some node of type 0 further down. Using this bijection we can label in the natural way the edges of the reduced tree with values from {0, 1}
sn . Then every path in the reduced tree corresponds to a word whose hash can be computed by the adversary, with the value of that hash being the value of the terminal node for that path. Thus the reduced tree gives a sort of digest of which hashes the adversary can compute 6 from the queries Q. For the attack, the adversary will make queries so as to grow the known-hash tree in a greedy fashion. It will make queries to π 1 , . . . , π k in cyclical order. When the adversary makes a query to π i it will choose a value x i that maximizes the number of terminal nodes of type i in the known-hash tree that have value x i ; that is, the adversary simply chooses the value such that there are a largest possible number of terminal nodes of type i with that value in the known-hash tree (here a terminal node is a leaf of the known-hash tree). If there are no terminal nodes of type i, the adversary can make an arbitrary query to π i . We assume the adversary makes kp queries in all, namely p queries to every permutation. Note that at any given query the known-hash tree could "blow up" and go to infinity; the number of added edges may be much larger than the number of terminal nodes.
This completes the description of the attack. We will now argue that, for q sufficiently large, the adversary has a good chance of obtaining a collision. First note that with kp greedy queries (not the ones we have described above), the pigeonhole argument shows that we can compute the value of the compression function on at least rn of the number of points w ∈ {0, 1} sn for which we can compute the value of the compression function on input h w is
On the other hand, the same average is approximated by the average outdegree of a node in the reduced tree after the adversary has carried out the above tree attack: every node corresponds to a value of h, and every outgoing edge corresponds to a value of w for which the output of the compression function on input h w is known. The (heuristic) assumption underlying the tree attack is that for moderately large values of p, this outdegree average should approximate the average (2); after all, both the pigeonhole attack and the tree attack choose queries greedily. Then if (2) is moderately large, say equal to 2, we expect the reduced tree to have average outdegree close to 2. But any tree with average outdegree exceeding 1 must be infinite, and must also have unbounded width; thus the reduced tree has blown up to infinity and we can find a collision by the pigeonhole principle (and even find a collision at the same level of the treemeaning a collision of equal-length strings-because the width is unbounded).
To be more concrete, say that we choose p = q/k large enough that
Then one would expect that with some constant probability close to 1, but say with at least probability 1/2, the tree attack yields a reduced tree of average outdegree exceeding 1. Then the reduced tree has blown up to infinity and we hold a collision. This would give us an attack with probability of success 1/2. The cost of the attack would be q = kp where
which is to say q ≈ k 2 1/k N 1−α ≤ 2k N 1−α , because α = s/k. This is an improvement on the bound for the pigeonhole-birthday attack since we expect k to be significantly smaller than n. Most iterated hash functions have s = 1, in which case k = k/s = 1/α = β and the bound of Theorem 7 can be rewritten as 2β N 1−α ; this is the version of the bound used for the numerical examples of Fig. 3 . Note that for α = k = 1, the case considered by Black et al. [2] , the tree attack gives a bound of q = 2 queries. This may seem seem small, but as Black et al. note, any construction in which for any h, x 1 ∈ {0, 1} n there is some w ∈ {0, 1} n such that x 1 = f 1 (h, w) can indeed be broken in two queries, using the same argument as for the tree attack (in such a construction, the tree trivially blows up to infinity after just two queries, with uniform reduced outdegree of 2). Moreover, natural constructions will have this feature since it seems undesirable for the function f 1 (h, ·) to contain collisions (as a function from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n ). However, for constructions that are artificially designed to hold off the attack, the bound 2kN 1−α may be overly optimistic when it is very small (but in this case one does not much mind being off).
